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CRIMINAL LAW-USE OF EQUITABLE TOLLING
TO ENFORCE VIOLATIONS OF SUPERVISED
RELEASE AFTER ORIGINAL TERM HAS
EXPIRED-UNITED STATES V BUCHANAN, 638

F.3D 448 (4TH CIR. 2011)
The equitable tolling principle allows a court to suspend the
"clock" of a statutorily mandated time limitation in the interests of equity.'
The doctrine is used by the court to ensure that an individual does not
escape justice simply because of a lapse in time. 2 In United States v.
Buchanan,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
examined whether the period of supervised release is tolled when an
individual absconds from mandated federal supervision and becomes a
fugitive. 4 The Fourth Circuit held that the period of supervised release is
tolled while the individual is a fugitive, and subsequently, the individual is
held accountable beyond the original term for violations of the provisions
of the supervised release. 5
In 1991, William Buchanan pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
fifty grams or more of crack cocaine, and he received a sentence of 120
months in prison.6 Buchanan was then released in March 1993 and his
term of supervised release began.7 However, in May 1994, police in Ohio
arrested Buchanan following his indictment on state drug trafficking
charges. 8 When arrested in Ohio, he used the name William Buchanan and
provided the same date of birth and social security number as "Kenneth

1 See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (describing equity principles). The
Supreme Court further notes that "[t]his equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of
limitation." Id.
2 See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing
equitable tolling and describing rationale for applicability). "It permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar
of the statute of limitations if despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information
bearing on the existence of his claim." Id.
3 638 F.3d 448 (4th Cir. 2011).
4 Id. at 450-51 (noting issue before the court).
5 Id. at 458 (stating holding of the case).
6 Id. at 449. The sentence was subsequently reduced to thirty months imprisonment based on
a substantial assistance motion. Id. At the time of the conviction, William Buchanan was known
as Kenneth Parker. See United States v. Buchanan, 632 F. Supp. 2d 554, 555 n.1 (E.D. Va.
2009).
7 See Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 449. The five-year supervised release term was scheduled to
last until March 1998. Id.
8 Id.
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Parker." 9 In February 1995, Buchanan failed to appear in court to face the
state drug trafficking charges, and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. 10
In April 1995, Buchanan's probation officer filed a "Petition on
Probation and Supervised Release," alleging multiple violations of the
terms of his supervised release."
Buchanan remained a fugitive until
December 2008, when police arrested him in Georgia. 12 Upon learning that
Buchanan was being held in custody, based on his extensive history of
alleged criminal activities while a fugitive, Buchanan's probation officer in
Virginia filed an addendum to the "Petition on Probation and Supervised
Release" alleging the newly discovered violations of the terms of his
supervised release.' 3 Buchanan conceded that the first petition filed in
1995 was properly before the court, but he challenged the addendum to the
petition as beyond the term of supervised release originally set to expire in
March 1998.14 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia held that the supervised release term was tolled while Buchanan
was a fugitive, based on the lack of clear statutory guidance governing
supervised release and the congressional intent in creating the supervised
release program. 1 5 The district court found Buchanan guilty of three of the

9 See Buchanan, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 555 (discussing Buchanan's use of different names when
arrested). The federal probation officer in charge of his supervision did not learn of the state drug
charge until nearly a year after the initial indictment. Id.
10 See Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 449. The last contact Buchanan had with his federal probation
officerwas in January 1995. Id.
11 Id. The violations included the state drug trafficking charge in Ohio, failure to report to
his probation officer, and failure to notify his probation officer of a change in his residence or
employment. Id.
12 Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 449.
13 Id. These violations included:
(1) in September 1996, Buchanan was arrested in Alabama for marijuana trafficking;
(2) in March 2005, he was arrested in Missouri for (inter ala) possession of a
controlled substance and unlawful use of a weapon; (3) in January 2008, he was
arrested in Georgia for driving under the influence; and (4) in December 2008, he was
arrested in Georgia for entering an auto or other motor vehicle with intent to commit a
theft or felony, and financial transaction card fraud.
Id. at 449-50; see also Buchanan, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 556-57 (describing aliases and different
identification used by Buchanan to avoid arrest). It was discovered upon his apprehension in
Georgia that Buchanan, although arrested on a number of occasions while a fugitive, avoided
identification as a fugitive by providing false names, birth dates, driver's licenses, and social
security numbers. Buchanan, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 556-57.
14 See Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 450.
15 See Buchanan, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 558-59 (analyzing statute and lack of clear guidance on
issue). The district court reasoned that the intent of Congress in creating supervised release was
for the rehabilitation and reintegration of convicted criminals into society. Id. at 559. The goals
of the statute could only be achieved through the monitoring and supervision of the convicted
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supervised release violations, two of which occurred after the original term
of supervised release expired. 16 The Fourth Circuit upheld this decision,
deciding that a term of supervised release is tolled while an individual is
beyond the supervision of government authorities, and that the individual

should be held liable for all violations of the supervised release while a
fugitive. 17
18 U.S.C. §3583 regulates the supervised release system imposed
on certain individuals convicted of federal crimes.' 8 The statute provides
specific statutory limits for the term of supervised release and provides for
an express tolling provision in one specific instance: incarceration lasting
more than thirty days. 19 The courts, however, have utilized the longestablished theory of equitable tolling in certain cases to enforce the
congressional intent of a statute.2 0
The federal courts look at the

circumstances surrounding a case to decide whether to use equitable
principles in the interest of justice. 2 ' The Fourth Circuit, while addressing

criminals by government officials. Id.
16 Id.
The court then imposed sentences of forty-eight months, thirty-six months, and
twenty-seven months to run concurrently. Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 450.
17 See Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 458 (stating holding of case).
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006) (amended 2008) (describing terms of release and supervision
for federal prisoners); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 123-24 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3306-07 (describing congressional intent and design of supervised release
program).
19 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(b), 3624(e) (2006) (amended 2008) (stating time limits and that
supervised release does not run during incarceration over thirty days). The statute also allows the
court to revoke supervised release beyond the original term to give courts the power to punish an
offender for earlier violations. 18 U.S.C. § 3 583(i). Congress amended the statute by adding this
section after the courts had utilized equitable tolling in this situation to ensure that the intent of
the statute was carried out even if there was a lapse in time. See United States v. Janvier, 599
F.3d 264, 265-66 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing judicial history leading up to adoption of
amendment). After a number of judicial decisions authorizing the courts to revoke supervised
release after the term had concluded, Congress enacted an amendment to make that authorization
explicit and establish the statutory standards. Id. at 266 (citing Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110505, 108 Stat. 1796, 2017 (1994)).
20 See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (noting breadth of potential
application of equitable principles). But see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 396 (2007) (noting
equitable tolling should only be used in rare occasions). "Equitable tolling is a rare remedy to be
applied in unusual circumstances, not a cure-all for an entirely common state of affairs." Id.
21 See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing need
for court's discretion in applying doctrine); see also United States v. Delamora, 451 F.3d 977,
980 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding when defendant absconded and used alias state did not have
opportunity to enforce law). His actions did not give the state the opportunity to file for a
violation of the term of his supervised release, so tolling was in the interest of justice. Delamora,
451 F.3d at 980; Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) ("This Court has permitted
equitable tolling in situations 'where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by
filing a defective pleading during the statutory period .... '). In Young, the Court reasoned that
the claimants had taken the steps available to enforce the claim within the statutory period and

172

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

post-incarceration supervision, originally considered equitable tolling with
regards to probation violations.2 2 The court has further utilized equitable
tolling in the context of an escapee from prison who claims that his time as
a fugitive should be credited to his sentence so as not to reward illegal
conduct. 23 Two federal circuits had previously addressed the issue of
equitable tolling in the supervised release context and have come to
different conclusions.2 4
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the first federal
circuit to consider the issue of fugitive tolling in the supervised release
context and has in subsequent cases reiterated its earlier findings. 25 The

should, therefore, be afforded an opportunity to amend the complaint when new claims come to
light. Young, 535 U.S. at 50. The Court then looked at the statutory construction of the federal
bankruptcy statute at issue. Id. at 52-53. The Court rejected the contention that an express tolling
provision in one section of the statute gave the impression that Congress intentionally did not
include tolling provisions in other sections of the statute. Id. The Court looked at the differences
between the sections and found that this suggested that the express tolling provision was not a
clear indicator that Congress had considered tolling for all sections. Id. at 53. See generally
Barreto-Barreto v. United States, 551 F.3d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[T]he petitioners carry the
burden of demonstrating that extraordinary circumstances beyond their control 'prevented timely
filing,' or that they were 'materially misled into missing the deadline."' (quoting Trenkler v.
United States, 268 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 2001))).
22 See United States v. Workman, 617 F.2d 48, 51 (4th Cir. 1980) (allowing tolling
if
individual commits voluntary act which results in lack of supervision). In Workman, the
individual had his probation revoked for two alleged violations, which were then overturned on
appeal. Id. at 49-50. The district court ruled that the probation period was tolled while the case
was on appeal from the district court to the Fourth Circuit because the defendant was not under
probation at that time, was not supervised by any court officer, and was not incarcerated. Id. at
50. The Fourth Circuit held that because this period of no supervision was caused through no
fault of the individual's, the court had no authority to toll the period of probation. Id. at 51; see
also Andersonv. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923) ("Mere lapse of time without imprisonment or
other restraint contemplated by the law does not constitute service of sentence.").
23 United States v. Luck, 664 F.2d 311, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Anderson v. Corall, 263
U.S. 193, 196 (1923)) ("It is well established that when the service of a sentence is interrupted by
conduct of the defendant the time spent out of custody on his sentence is not counted as time
served thereon.").
24 Compare United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating
term of supervised release can be tolled when individual absconds from justice), with United
States v. Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d 63, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding statutory canon expressio
unius est exclusio alterius does not permit court to toll term).
25 See Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d at 953 (tolling period of supervised release based on
fugitive status). In Murguia-Oliveros, the United States government convicted Margarito
Murguia-Oliveros of illegal immigration and sentenced him to a period of incarceration,
deportation, and a three-year term of supervised release. Id. at 952. He subsequently violated a
condition of his supervised release by reentering the United States and the police rearrested him
on an unrelated charge. Id. The court revoked his term of supervised release when the arrest
occurred, nearly three months after the original term was set to expire. Id. at 953. The Ninth
Circuit held that his term of supervised release was tolled while he was a fugitive because the
court should not reward an individual who flees from justice by continuing to run the "clock"
without any federal supervision. Id. at 954. The court stated a long held principle that "we
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court found that the term of supervised release should be tolled while an
individual is a fugitive to ensure that the individual does not benefit from
his flight and that the goals of Congress in enacting the legislation are
accomplished.2 6 The court found it compelling that the individual did not
receive the rehabilitative supervision intended by Congress with the
enactment of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994.27 The Ninth Circuit subsequently confirmed the holding of United
States v. Murguia-Oliveros28 in United States v. Watson,29 reaffirming that
an individual should serve the full term of his supervised release while
being both monitored by government officials and being held accountable
for violations of terms of release, to avoid rewarding wrongful acts. 0
The First Circuit, however, has held that the equitable tolling
provision is not available to courts under the statutory construction canon
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.3' In United States v. Hernandezshould not reward those who violate the terms of their supervised release and avoid arrest until
after the original term expires." Id. (citing United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.
1992)).
26 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (explaining supervised release is its
own form of restraint separate from imprisonment); Murguia-Oliveros,421 F.3d at 954 (stating
standard not to reward flight from justice). "[Flederal supervised release ... in contrast to
probation, is meted out in addition to, not in lieu of, incarceration." Samson, 547 U.S. at 850
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 461 (2d Cir.
2002)); see also Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1959) (stating longheld principle that individual should not gain from unlawful conduct); United States v. Kosko,
870 F.2d 162, 163-64 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing long-standing federal doctrine that individuals
should not benefit from their own wrongful conduct).
27 See Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d at 954; see also United States v. Jackson, 426 F.3d 301,
305 (5th Cir. 2005) (shortening period of supervised release interferes with congressional goal of
rehabilitation).
In Jackson, the court recognized that the goal of supervised release was
rehabilitation and reentry into the community. Id. Congress, in replacing the probation system
with supervised release, established specific rules and regulations to guide the supervised release
system to achieve these goals. Id. The court recognized that supervision was an integral part of
the process, and that without monitoring by a probation officer, "it was impossible for his
probation officer to assist him in returning to the community." Id. See generally S. REP. No. 98225, at 124 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3307 (1983) (describing intent of
supervised release and goals of new program). Congress described some of the goals of the
statute as "the need for the sentence to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,"
but also as "the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment." Id.
28 421 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2005).
29 633 F.3d 929 (9thCir. 2011).
30 See id. at 931-32 (describing development of fugitive tolling provision in Ninth Circuit).
In Watson, the defendant violated the terms of his supervised release and became a fugitive. Id.
at 932. The court held that the term of supervised release tolled until the government was able to
resume supervision. Id. In this case, the period of supervised release was tolled until Watson was
rearrested. Id. The court confirmed the holdings in Crane and Murguia-Oliveros, and restated
that an individual should not benefit by absconding from supervised release. Id. at 931-32.
31 See United States v. HeiAndez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d 63, 67-68 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating
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32
Ferrer,
the court reasoned that because 18 U.S.C. §3624(e) provides an
express statutory tolling provision for terms of incarceration lasting longer
than thirty days, Congress did not intend to allow any other tolling of the
term of supervised release.33 The court further noted that a plain-language

reading of the statute limited the sanctions to the "supervised release term,"
taking that to mean the original time period imposed by the court.34 The
First Circuit also found it persuasive that the individual who absconds from

justice can still be prosecuted for the initial violation of the terms of his
supervised release in the very act of becoming a fugitive, and further, that
the court at sentencing may take into account the subsequent violations
committed after the term had expired.35 The court reasoned that tolling
should only be utilized in limited circumstances, and it did not believe that

statutory canon applies to supervised release statutes). In Hernandez-Ferrer,the court sentenced
the individual to supervised release as part of a conviction for conspiracy to distribute narcotics.
Id. at 64. While on supervised release, the government charged the individual with a new
narcotics offense, and he was later arrested on January 11, 2006 after nearly six months as a
fugitive; one day after the term of supervised release expired. Id.at 65. Four months later, the
government filed a supplemental motion alleging a violation of the terms of his supervised release
based on the new arrest. Id. The court reasoned that the violation had occurred outside his term
of supervised release based on a plain-language reading of the statute. Id.at 66. Further, the
court found it compelling that the statute contained an express tolling provision with regards to
terms of incarceration lasting longer than thirty days. Id. at 67. Citing a number of decisions
surrounding expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the First Circuit held that the court could not
read equitable tolling into the statute. Id. Contra State ex rel Curtis v. De Corps, 16 N.E.2d 459,
462 (Ohio 1938), quoted in Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168-69 (2003)
("[Expressio unius] properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas in the mind of
the reader that which is expressed is so set over by way of strong contrast to that which is omitted
that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference ....). Expressio unius est exclusio alteriusis
"[a] canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of
the other, or of the alternative." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009).
32 599 F.3d 63 (1stCir. 2010).
" See id.at 67-68 (citing statutory construction canon as not allowing equitable tolling
provision). "The absence of an express tolling provision for fugitive status, coupled with the
presence of an express tolling provision that encompasses other circumstances, is highly
significant." Id. at 67. Contra Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 52 (2002) (holding tolling
provision did not exclude possibility for other equitable tolling in bankruptcy context).
"Congress is presumed to draft limitations periods in light of the principle that such periods are
customarily subject to equitable tolling unless tolling would be inconsistent with statutory text."
Id.at44.
34 See Hernandez-Ferrer,599 F.3d at 66 (stating plain meaning of statute is clear);
see also
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000) (holding that just because statute allows one
exception, courts cannot read further exceptions into language). Contra Chickasaw Nation v.
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (stating statutory construction canons are not mandatory for
courts to follow); United States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging
sentencing should not be "hyper-technical exercise devoid of common sense"); 82 C.J.S. Statutes
§ 424 (2011) (stating construction maxim is not strict rule but in place to provide guidance).
35 See Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d at 69 (stating court's belief that sufficient penalties
existed to deter violations of supervised release).
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a tolling provision was necessary to carry out the statute's goals, in light of
the other deterrents in place.36
In United States v. Buchanan, the Fourth Circuit embraced the
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and held that reading an equitable tolling
provision into the statute satisfied congressional intent.3 7 The Fourth
Circuit analogized the standard created for parole cases to the supervised
release standard and found that case law favored equitable tolling in post-

incarceration cases where the government was intended to have a measure
of supervision over the individual.38 The Fourth Circuit did not agree with
Buchanan's argument, which he based on the standard adopted by the First
Circuit: that the statutory construction canon and a plain-language reading
of the statute did not allow equitable tolling to be used.3 9 The court was not
convinced that Congress had considered the possibility of fugitive flight

when drafting the statute, and that Congress, therefore, could not have
intentionally prohibited the use of tolling by the courts in other scenarios to
carry out the intent of the statute . 40 Based on the court's interpretation of
the congressional intent in enacting the statute, the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that the individual should not receive credit to his time of supervised
release when he was not subject to the supervision of the government.4i
The Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that equitable tolling
should be utilized to ensure the accomplishment of Congress's intent in
enacting the supervised release statute. 42 By absconding from supervision,
Buchanan frustrated the intent of Congress in creating supervised release36

Id. (describing other means courts have to punish individuals for flight from supervised

release).
37 See United States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 454-55 (4th Cir. 2011) (outlining Ninth and

First Circuits arguments and embracing equitable tolling); see also United States v. MurguiaOliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2005) (outlining holding inMurguia-Oliveros).
38 See Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 452; see also United States v. Workman, 617 F.2d 48, 51 (4th
Cir. 1980) (discussing holding in probation case where court utilized equitable tolling). Probation
and supervised release were both forms of government supervision designed to reintegrate people
convicted of criminal offenses back into society. Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 452. The similarities of
the two systems allowed the court to utilize the case law relating to probation violations as
guidance. Id.
39 See Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 455; see also Chickasaw, 534 U.S. at 94 (explaining that
statutory construction canons are not mandatory).
40 See Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 456 ("[C]ourts should 'not read the enumeration of one case to
exclude another unless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility and
meant to say no to it."' (citation omitted) (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149,
168 (2003))).
41 See Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 454 ("[A] person on supervised release 'should not receive
credit against his period of supervised release for time that, by virtue of his own wrongful act, he
was not in fact observing the terms of his supervised release."' (quoting United States v.
Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2005))).
42 See Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 458.
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rehabilitation and reintegration. 43 Based on longstanding federal principals,
he should not be credited for his illegal action.4 4 The present case is
45
analogous to a number of past cases, such as United States v. Jackson,
where the courts have found that the goals of supervised release are not
being met if an individual is not being monitored.4 6

Further, statutory construction canons are not absolute mandates,
and the courts must look to the intent of Congress in enacting the statute .
Congress established supervised release to ensure that individuals who are
released from federal prison can be monitored and properly reintegrated
into society. 48 An individual should not avoid the restrictions, reintegration
programs, and deterrent penalties of supervised release by committing an
unlawful act that results in a sufficient lapse in time to end the term.49
Congress amended the statute in 1994 to allow the United States Probation

Office to file a petition within a reasonable amount of time after the
expiration of the term of supervised release, where an individual committed
a violation during that term of release. 50 Congress should similarly resolve
the current issue concerning equitable tolling by passing an amendment to
the statute that would provide for a fugitive tolling provision that would
ensure that individuals are held accountable for the violations of the terms
of the supervised release when they are recaptured."i Already, both the
Ninth and Fourth Circuits have properly addressed an issue that Congress
did not anticipate by utilizing equitable tolling.52 Congress should once
43 See supra note 15; supra notes 23, 27 and accompanying text (stating long held federal
belief to not reward poor behavior).
44 See supra note 26 and accompanying text; supra note 30 (explaining individuals should
not benefit from their illegal conduct).
4' 426 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2005).
46 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (stating goals of supervised release are frustrated
by lack of monitoring).
47 See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (discussing flexibility in
application of statutory construction canons); see also United States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 115,
119 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating sentencing should not be "devoid of common sense").
48 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 124 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3307
(describing congressional intent of supervised release and goals of program).
49 See United States v. Janvier, 599 F.3d 264, 265-66 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing lapse of
time alone should not allow individual to avoidjustice). "The necessary proceedings take time; if
courts lost the power to punish upon expiration of the release or probation term, proceedings on
charges of violations filed late in the term would either be rushed, leading to unreliable outcomes,
or delayed, leading to avoidance of just punishment." Id. at 266.
50 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing evolution of case law and
subsequent amendment to statute).
51 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (outlining courts' long-standing maxim that
individuals should not gain from wrongful conduct); see also supra note 19 (describing
Congress's amending statute to reflect courts' position on issue).
52 See United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing
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again amend the statute to ensure that the goals of supervised release are
not frustrated
by the passage of time due to an individual's inappropriate
53
actions.

Additionally, the Fourth Circuit should have further analogized the
situation to the civil matters where equitable tolling is utilized.54 In these
instances, a party is allowed to amend their filing after the statutory period
to correct a defective pleading if they attempted to file a proper motion, but
the actions of the other party prevented them from doing so.
The
government filed the initial motion within the statutorily-allowed period
based on the information they had regarding Buchanan's supervised release
violations. 56 Based on the standard set by the Supreme Court in Young v.
United States,57 equitable tolling can be used "where the claimant has
actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during
the statutory period., 58 The government further attempted to file a proper
motion, but Buchanan's active concealment of his identity while a fugitive
prevented this. 59 Therefore, once the government discovered Buchanan's
violations, it should have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to correct
the filing and charge Buchanan with his subsequent violations of the terms
of his supervised release .60 The use of equitable tolling and its rationale in
the civil context provides further support to the Fourth Circuit's use in this

reasoning of Ninth Circuit in utilizing equitable tolling); see also United States v. Buchanan, 638
F.3d 448, 456 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating Fourth Circuit did not believe Congress anticipated fugitive
status when drafting statute).
53 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing amendment to statute and judicial
history leading up to change).
54 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (describing history of equitable tolling in civil
lawsuits). The courts have applied the principle of equitable tolling in civil cases when the
opposing party has actively hidden their identity or offenses to utilize the statute of limitations for
improper purposes. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
55 See United States v. Delamora, 451 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing scenario
where party used alias and false identity to avoid detection).
56 See United States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 449 (4th Cir. 2011) (describing initial
petition filed by probation officer).
17 535 U.S. 43 (2002).
58 Id. at 50 (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)); see also
Delamora, 451 F.3d at 980 (stating claimant should be given opportunity to amend complaint
once new causes come to light).
59 See United States v. Buchanan, 632 F. Supp. 2d 554, 556-57 (E.D. Va. 2009) (describing
aliases and false identities used by Buchanan when arrested). Buchanan avoided detection by
federal authorities each time he was arrested by providing local arresting authorities with false
personal information. See id
60 See United States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 449 (4th Cir. 2011) (describing filing
of
addendum in 2009 once Buchanan was rearrested). See generally supra note 21 and
accompanying text (describing ability to amend filings once infornation discovered in civil
context).
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criminal case. 6 '
In United States v. Buchanan, the Fourth Circuit joined the Ninth
Circuit court in holding that a term of supervised release may be tolled
while an individual is a fugitive. This decision enforces the congressional
intent in enacting the statute by ensuring that an individual on supervised
release serves their full term while being monitored and rehabilitated by a
probation officer. The First Circuit erred by applying the statutory
construction canon without a clear indication that Congress had considered
the possibility of an individual becoming a fugitive during the term of
supervised release and committing subsequent crimes. The Fourth Circuit
correctly applied equitable tolling in the fugitive status context, and
Congress should once again amend the statute to fully carry out the
statute's intended purpose.
Eric Speed

61

See generallyBuchanan, 638 F.3d at 455 (describing holding of case).

